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ABSTRACT
Unfunded defined-benefit (DB) public pension plans throughout the world are being converted
to funded defined-contribution (DC) plans that typically contain a minimum benefit guarantee (DC-MB).
Risk management techniques must be used to control the cost of these guarantees. The most common
technique is to ￿over-fund￿ the benefit: the contribution rate is set high enough so that the expected
benefit is much larger than the guaranteed minimum benefit.
This paper shows that while over-funding is very effective in controlling guarantee costs in
traditional DB plans, it is highly ineffective for DC-MB plans. This result holds even at very large
contribution rates and when risky investments are restricted to a very diversified index like the S&P500.
Calculations show that the true risk-adjusted value of unfunded guarantees in a realistic DC-MB plan
equals 40 to 90 percent (or more) of the value of the unfunded liability in the DB benefit being replaced,
depending on design. This result is true even when the contribution rate in the DC-MB plan is chosen to
produce an expected benefit five times larger than the DB benefit.
This paper considers two approaches to controlling guarantee costs. The first approach borrows
from the recent catastrophic insurance literature. A ￿standardized￿ portfolio is guaranteed, requiring
agents to accept ￿basis risk￿ if they chose a non-standard portfolio. However, for large conversions from
DB to DC-MB plans, in which there is little or no DB benefit remaining, the government must still worry
about any ￿implicit guarantee￿ extending beyond the standardized portfolio, thereby enticing agents to
accept a lot of basis risk (a ￿Samaritan￿s Dilemma￿). The second method, therefore, uses a more brute
force approach: private portfolio returns in the good states of the world are taxed while returns in the bad
states are subsidized. Both options are very effective at controlling guarantee costs, and they can be used
separately or together. Calculations demonstrate that all of the unfunded liabilities associated with modern
pay-as-you-go public pension programs can be eliminated under both approaches even at a modest
contribution rate.
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I. Introduction
Pay-as-you-go public pension systems, like the US Social Security system, contain large
unfunded liabilities.  More funding, maybe as part of a privatization plan, could reduce burdens on
future generations.  But conversions of public pension systems to a system with individually-
managed accounts often contain unfunded liabilities of their own.  The main liability takes the form
of a guarantee made by the government to each participant.  Specifically, the government promises
that each new private account will be large enough at the point of retirement to pay an annuitized
benefit level above some minimum level.  But assets, equal in value to the ex-ante cost of these
guarantees are almost never set aside for this purpose.  Instead, these guarantees are pay-as-you-go,
or unfunded. Managing the cost of these guarantees, therefore, is critical to the success of any
conversion.  The most common technique currently being used to control these costs is to “over-
fund” the benefit: the contribution rate is set high enough so that the expected benefit is much larger
than the guaranteed minimum benefit.  But this paper shows that this technique is not very effective
at controlling these costs.  Two alternative methods are proposed, both of which are effective.
Public Pension Conversions throughout the World
Many countries have converted their public pension systems from pay-as-you-go Defined-
Benefit (DB) plans to Defined-Contribution plans with Minimum Benefit guarantees (DC-MB).
Chile’s conversion began in 1981.  The Chilean government guarantees that private accounts for new
workers will produce a minimum pension payment equal to about 25 percent of average wages.  The
recently converted Mexican retirement system guarantees about 40 percent of average wages.  Other
countries with converted retirement systems include Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Columbia, El
Salvador, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Peru, Poland, Switzerland, and United Kingdom (CBO, 1998).
12 Due to long-term insolvency problems facing Social Security, maintaining present-law benefit levels requires
increasing the payroll tax rate from 12.3 percent of payroll to over 19 percent  (Social Security Trustees, 2000).  The
Feldstein-Samwick “lite” plan would increase funding today in order to avoid a payroll tax increase in the future.  Hence,
Feldstein and Samwick are tackling the hardest baseline, rather than a baseline with smaller benefits.
3 Investment risk is addressed in Feldstein, Ranguelova and Samwick (2001) and in other articles by them
referenced therein.  US Social Security benefits for a person with average lifetime earnings is a little more than 40
percent of average wages.  Hence, the level of guarantee needed in the Feldstein-Samwick plan is similar to Mexico’s.
4 In a different context, a recent interesting paper by Stanton (2000) demonstrates how many 401(k) plans give
participants a valuable option to time retirement or rollovers.
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The United States has not yet begun the process of converting its public pension system to
a system based in part on private accounts.  But considerable debate is now taking place.  Many of
the plans being discussed include minimum benefit guarantees, including the plans by Feldstein and
Samwick (1997, 2000).  The original Feldstein-Samwick (1997) plan would convert the entire Social
Security system to private accounts.  Their newer “lite” version (2000) would introduce private
accounts to augment a reduced, but still positive, level of Social Security benefit that can be afforded
in the future at today’s payroll tax rate.
2  In both of their plans, pensioners receive a combined
(public plus private) benefit at least equal in value to the present-law Social Security benefit level.
3
Policymakers have also began devising their own plans with benefit guarantees.  In the proposal by
US Senator Phil Gramm (1998), for example, the government would guarantee that a worker
receives an annuitized benefit equal to the amount that they would have received under Social
Security plus twenty percent of the value of the investment they build up “over their working lives.”
The Cost of Guarantees
Among academics, it is becoming more appreciated in recent years that benefit guarantees
can be quite costly.  The cost of pension guarantees have been analyzed in papers by Pesando (1982),
Marcus (1985, 1987), Bodie and Merton (1993), and, most recently, Bodie (2001).
4  Smetters (2001)
focuses on recent privatization plans, including the Feldstein-Samwick (1997) plan and the Gramm
(1998) plan.  He shows that unfunded minimum benefit guarantees can be costly enough to undo5 Chile penalizes participating mutual funds that under-perform relative to the mean return.  However, it is the
risk in the mean return itself, associated with a broad portfolio, which is the focus of this paper.
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most of the salutary long-run benefit typically associated with funded private accounts.  The 1997
Feldstein-Samwick plan, for example, would eliminate existing unfunded liabilities in the long run
without a minimum benefit guarantee, but reduce them by only 15 percent if the government
guaranteed that agents received at least the present-law Social Security benefit level.  The guarantee
in the Gramm plan would likely increase unfunded liabilities.  The current paper considers strategies
to control these guarantee costs.
The Standard Method of Controlling Guarantee Costs: Over-funding
As explained in Bodie and Merton (1993), an effective method of managing the risk
associated with fixed guaranteed benefits inside traditional DB plans is as follows: frequently mark
fund assets and liabilities to market prices, adjust fund income (i.e., employer contributions) to
match assets with liabilities, and over-fund the expected benefit.  Over-funding means that the DB
fund holds more assets than necessary to pay future benefits, if asset returns take their expected
values.  Over-funding creates a buffer against shocks between the dates in which fund assets and
liabilities are marked to market.  Over-funding, therefore, reduces the need to sharply adjust
employer contributions in response to price shocks.
In DC plans containing minimum benefit guarantees (DC-MB), frequent marking to market,
with subsequent changes in income flows to private accounts, is intractable.  Frequent marking
would require frequently adjusting a worker’s contribution rate.  Moreover, private accounts would
have to be individually marked because, unlike a DB plan with a single portfolio, portfolio risk in
a DC-MB plan depends on a worker’s choice.  No country with a DC-MB plan incurs these
administrative costs.  Chile, for example, has not changed its contribution rate after inception twenty
years ago, much less implemented individual contribution rates.
56 CBO (1998) provides an overview of the literature analyzing the Chilean pension plans.  Several of the DC-
MB plan in developing countries have domestic investment restrictions in order to encourage domestic capital market
development.  These restrictions, combined with undeveloped domestic capital markets, poses additional risks. 
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Instead, the primary risk management technique employed by DC-MB plans is over-funding.
In particular, the mandatory payroll contribution rate in the DC-MB system is chosen so that the
expected cross-sectional average benefit level is significantly larger than the guarantee minimum
benefit level.  For example, the mandatory contribution rate in Chile is 10 percent of payroll, which
is generally believed to produce an average expected benefit level that is significantly larger than the
minimum benefit level.  The same approach has been taken in Argentina (11 percent of payroll),
Mexico (8½ percent of payroll), and is the dominate strategy in most countries.
6
The over-funding strategy has also been considered pension reform in the United States.  As
Bodie (1995) clearly demonstrates, the standard investor lore that stock holdings become low risk
if held for a long time is misguided.  Still, Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick (2001) do present
monte carlo evidence suggesting that their privatization plan fails, with only a modest to small
probability, to produce a retirement benefit at least equal to what pensioners would have received
under Social Security.  The probability of shortfall becomes smaller as the contribution rate is
increased.  Hieger and Shipman (1997) present some limited monte carlo evidence to argue that a
large enough payroll tax (taken as today’s contribution level) would, if invested in stocks, fail to
produce the current Social Security benefit with only a small probability.  Senator’s Gramm plan
would require smaller contributions, equal to about 8½ percent of payroll which, by his staff’s
calculations, would still produce an expected benefit several times larger than Social Security.  But
these types of probability calculations do not capture the large utility value, as reflected in the equity
premium, that the market places on protection against large shortfalls, even though uncommon. 7 Some preliminary analysis on this point was also presented in Smetters (2001), although the reasoning is
flushed out in much more detail herein.  Moreover, the model herein is more detailed and this paper considers remedies.
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Over-Funding is Very Ineffective for Controlling Guarantee Costs in DC-MB Plans
Section III shows that the popular over-funding approach to controlling guarantee costs,
while effective for DB plans, has very little effect in DC-MB plans.
7  This surprising result holds
even at large contribution rates, and even when risky investments are restricted to a very diversified
stock index like the S&P500.  Calculations show that the ex-ante value of unfunded liabilities in
realistic DC-MB plans equal about 40 to 90 percent (or more) of the unfunded liability of the
guaranteed DB benefit being replaced, depending on design.  This fact is true even when the
contribution rate in the DC-MB plan is chosen to produce an expected benefit five times larger than
the DB benefit.
A large amount of the guarantee cost stems from moral hazard.  As proven in Section III,
agents will only hold risky stocks in their DC-MB account in order to maximize the value of the
guarantee. Bonds are only held in their non-mandatory private saving accounts (with assumed
identical tax status).  Any risk management method to control the cost of guarantee risk must, in part,
therefore, reverse this excessive risk taking.
New Risk Management Techniques are Needed
New risk management techniques, therefore, are needed to control the cost of guarantees.
Like Smetters (1998), Feldstein and Ranguelova (2000), for example, suggest that participants in
DC-MB plans could sell part of their upside potential (taking the short side of a call option) as a
means for paying for downside protection (taking the long side of a put option).  Unlike Smetters
(1998), however, Feldstein and Ranguelova suggest that these securities could be provided by the
private market at a reasonable cost, whereas Smetters focused on government provision as an
integral part of prefunding Social Security.  The problem with relying on the private market is that8 See Doherty and Smetters (2001) for the motivation of catastrophic risk contracts.  The usefulness of indexed
contracts in pension reform was triggered by two very helpful conversations with Andrew Samwick and Martin Feldstein.
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these options require long maturity dates and the private market has already revealed it’s
unwillingness to provide them.  In fact, the longest maturity period currently available for options
is three years.  Moreover, the market for these securities (indexed LEAPS) is very thin, probably
since the securities are much costlier than the price suggested by the standard option pricing formula,
like that used by Feldstein and Ranguelova.  Achieving prices consistent with standard option pricing
formula would, at a minimum, require smoothing risks between generations -- a task that requires
the use of the government’s taxing authority.  Another problem is that rational agents won’t hold
protection against downside risk in their guaranteed accounts unless they’re forced (see below).  A
good risk management technique would allow for portfolio choice due to preference heterogeneity.
Overview of this Paper
New strategies of risk management, therefore, are needed in the new era of DC-MB accounts.
The remainder of this paper considers two methods of controlling the cost of a benefit guarantee.
The first method, analyzed in Section IV, borrows an idea from the recent catastrophic insurance
literature.  The guarantee is placed over a “standardized” portfolio, requiring agents to accept any
“basis risk” if they chose a non-standard portfolio.
8  However, the usefulness of this method is
probably limited to smaller DB to DC-MB conversions, like those being discussed in the United
States, in which at least a modest DB benefit remains.  The reason is that even though this technique,
in theory, works well at reducing moral hazard, agents might, as a practical matter, anticipate an
“implicit guarantee” and, therefore, assume a lot of basis risk – a so-called Samaritan’s Dilemma.
The second method, analyzed in Section V, therefore, involves a little more brute force while still
allowing for a fair amount of portfolio selection.  It taxes assets in DC-MB accounts in good states
of the world and subsidies assets in bad states of the world.  This approach is generally more flexible9 I am grateful to Zvi Bodie, John Campbell, Martin Feldstein, and Steven Ross for their insights.
10 A zero gross return is allowed as a possible discrete outcome in order to incorporate a limiting state of the
continuous log-normal distribution.  It is not necessary.  The calculations presented later assume log-normal returns.
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relative to a stock-bond portfolio mandate.  Both methods effectively reduce guarantee costs, and
they can be used separately or together.  Calculations show that all of the unfunded liabilities
associated with modern pay-as-you-go public pension programs can be eliminated under both
approaches, even at a modest contribution rate.  Section VI concludes.
II. Intuition
It is not immediately intuitive why over-funding retirement benefits only barely reduces the
value of unfunded liabilities in defined contribution plans with minimum benefit guarantees (DC-
MB).  So this section presents a simple example to illustrate the key conceptual points before diving
into the model presented in Section III.
9  The example is then used to show why over-funding is
effective in traditional DB plans.  Finally, remedies for reducing liabilities in DC-MB plans are
illustrated.  This section was added in response to feedback I received by several readers desiring a
firmer grasp of the intuition.  It can be skipped without much loss in continuity.
The Ineffectiveness of Over-Funding in Reducing Liabilities in DC-MB plans
Suppose that a $1 payroll contribution is invested in risky stocks for 30 years and that the
following gross annual average internal real rates of return can occur with ¼
th probability: {0%,
103%, 110%, 120%}.






30} = {$0.0, $2.43, $17.45, $237.38}.  Suppose that
the government guarantees that the $1 investment will be worth $5 in 30 years.  This guarantee,
therefore, pays off if either the 0% state (producing $0.0) or the 103% state (producing $2.43) are
realized.  However, the lion’s share of the guarantee value is associated with the really bad 0 % state.11 Formally, suppose state s in the state space S occurs with probability   and let   be the price of an ( ) π s ( ) ps
(Arrow) security that pays one unit of consumption in state s.  An investor maximizes expected utility  ( )( ) ( ) π sucs ∑




is the marginal utility of wealth.  Hence, bad states are characterized by a high marginal utility and high Arrow prices.
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The high value stems from the fact that (i) the number of dollars paid by the government is highest
in that state ($5 - $0 = $5) and, (ii) the value of each dollar paid in that bad state carries lots of utility
value in the presence of risk aversion.
11
Suppose, to reduce the guarantee’s value, the government requires that people double their
payroll contribution to $2.  Now the possible asset value outcomes also double and become {$0.0,
$4.86, $34.90, $474.76}.  If the 103% state (producing $4.86) is realized then the government only
pays $0.14 ($5 - $4.86) under a $2 contribution level instead of $2.57 ($5 - $2.43) under the $1 level.
Hence, increasing the contribution level from $1 to $2 reduces the government’s liability by $2.43
($2.57 - $0.14) in this state.  But notice that the higher contribution level did not reduce the value
of the guarantee associated with the bad 0% state, where most of the guarantee value is derived.  
Suppose that the government triples the contribution level to $3.  Now the possible asset
value outcomes also triple and become {$0.0, $7.29, $52.35, $712.14}.  This increase in the
contribution rate reduces the cost of the $5 minimum benefit guarantee even more.  The government
now owes nothing if the 103% state is realized.  However, the government’s liability is now reduced
by only $0.14 in this state relative to the $2 contribution level.  (In contrast, recall that the
government saved $2.43 in this state when the contribution rate was increased from $1 to $2.)
Again, no money is saved on the costly 0% state.
Now suppose the government increases the contribution level to $4.  The 30-year asset set
is now {$0.0, $9.72, $69.80, $949.52}.  Notice that this policy change has had no marginal impact
on the value of the guarantee.  The reason is that the 103% state was already above the guarantee- 9 -
level at a $3 contribution.  Moreover, again, the contribution level has no impact on the 0% state.
In sum, one should suspect that (i) over-funding is not very effective at controlling guarantee
costs in DC-MB plans because over-funding has little impact on the really bad – and mostly costly
– states of the world, and (ii) over-funding’s marginal impact at reducing costs is even lower at
higher levels of funding.  The above example is trivial, but the same mechanics are at work in the
model below.  Indeed, the reader can replace the 0% state event, which was used to simplify the
presentation, with a positive value like 10%.  Before summarizing the intuition for these results, I
consider some examples of effective risk management.
The Effectiveness of Over-Funding in Reducing Liabilities in Traditional DB Plans
Let’s continue with the example, except change the guarantee form.  As before, the following
gross annual real rates of return of return to stocks can occur with ¼
th probability: {0%, 103%,
110%, 120%}.  Hence, as before, the final assets in 30 years will take one of the values in the
following set with ¼
th probability at the $1 contribution level: {$0.0, $2.43, $17.45, $237.38}.  But
suppose instead of guaranteeing a minimum benefit equal to $5, the government instead guarantees
a fixed benefit equal to $5, like in a traditional DB plan.  In other words, if the value of assets in a
new DC-MB account at retirement is below $5, the government subsidizes that account to bring its
value up to $5.  But if retirement assets exceed $5 then the government taxes away all of the
difference.  Hence, the government faces a state-contingent liability in the following set, each with
a ¼
th probability: {$5 - $0, $5 - $2.43, $5 - $17.45, $5 - $237.38} = {$5, $2.57 , -$12.45, -$232.38}.
Notice that the government’s liability is negative in the 110% and 120% states, whereas its liability
was zero in these states in the minimum benefit example above.
What is important is not the exact numbers but how they change with the contribution rate.
Like before, doubling the contribution to $2 changes the 30-year asset set to {$0.0, $4.86, $34.90,- 10 -
$474.76}.  The liability set under the fixed benefit guarantee now becomes {$5 - $0, $5 - $4.86, $5 -
$34.90, $5 - $474.76} = {$5, $0.14 , -$29.9, -$469.76}, whereas it was {$5, $0.14, $0, $0} under
the minimum guarantee.  While doubling the contribution rate has little impact on the liability set
associated with the minimum guarantee, the change is significant under the fixed guarantee.  The
reason is that the government now collects lots of revenue in the good states of the world (negative
liabilities).  As shown later, the ex-ante value of receipts collected in the good states can actually
exceed the ex-ante value of the liabilities in the bad states.  I.e., the government can more than over-
fund its way out of an costly fixed guarantee.
Controlling Guarantee Costs in DC-MB Plans
One way, therefore, to reduce guarantee costs in DC-MB plans is to partly mimic a DB plan
by taxing retirement assets in DC-MB accounts in good states of the world, i.e., if assets exceed a
threshold value at retirement.  A tax in good states of the world helps compensate ex-ante the
subsidy given in bad states.  The extreme form of this approach is a traditional funded DB benefit
plan which, in effect, taxes 100 percent of any benefit in excess of the guaranteed minimum benefit,
while fully subsidizing the downside.    This type of state-contingent taxation is considered below.
But another approach, also considered herein, would be for the government to only guarantee
a “standardized” portfolio of assets, as in many modern catastrophic risk contracts.  Agents would
be required to accept any “basis risk” to the degree that they chose a non-standard portfolio.  For
example, suppose that a $1 contribution today has an equal chance of being worth either $10 or $20
in 30 years if $0.50 is invested in a broad stock index and $0.50 is invested in bonds.  We will call
this 50-50 stock-bond split the “standardized” portfolio.  The government guarantees that this
standardized portfolio will produce a benefit equal to $15.  So the government faces a liability equal
to $5 if the bad ($10) state is realized.  Suppose that an investor, however, chooses to invest the
entire $1 in stocks, which yields retirement assets $0 in the bad state or $40 in the good state with- 11 -
equal probability.  If the bad state is realized, the government only pays out the amount that it would
have owed in the bad state had the investor chosen the standardized 50-50 stock-bond split, or $5.
The investor bears the other $10 of the $15 minimum benefit as basis risk, which is the cost of
deviating from the standardized portfolio.
To illustrate how guaranteeing a standardized portfolio could effectively control costs, let’s
return to our previous example.  As before, the gross annual real rates of return of return to stocks
can take one the following values with ¼
th probability: {0%, 103%, 110 %, 120 %}.  Suppose that
the standardized portfolio is composed of a 50-50 split between stocks and bonds, and suppose that
the gross annual return to risk-less bonds is 100% (i.e., zero net return).  Then the gross annual real
rates of return of return in the standardized portfolio can take one the following values with ¼
th
probability: {50%, 101.5%, 105 %, 110%}.  Notice that standardization, therefore, lifts resources
in the bad state of the world by reducing resources in the good states.  Moreover, standardization
eliminates the absorbing state.
However, while in theory guaranteeing a standardized portfolio works well at reducing moral
hazard, agents might, as a practical matter, anticipate an “implicit guarantee” and, therefore, assume
a lot of basis risk – a so-called Samaritan’s Dilemma.  For the smaller type of conversion being
discussed in the United States, in which at least a modest DB benefit remains, the standardization
approach probably avoids this problem.  But the risk of a Samaritan’s Dilemma is problematic for
large reforms that leave little DB benefit in place.  In this case, state contingent taxes are needed.
Summary
The intuition why the common over-funding approach is less effective in reducing liabilities
relative to the two alternative approaches analyzed herein can be summarized as follows.  The over-
funding strategy proportionally increases retirement resources in every non-absorbing state of the
world (and has no effect in the absorbing state where all assets are lost).  In contrast, the alternative- 12 -
methods – state-contingent taxation and standardization – shift resources from the good states of the
world to the bad states (and, in the process, also eliminate absorbing states). In effect, the payoff in
each bad state is being partly financed by reducing the payoffs in the good states.  As a result, for the
same contribution rate, unfunded liabilities are lower under these two remedies relative to the
traditional over-funding approach which does not perform this shift.  Equivalently, state-contingent
taxation and standardization can achieve the same reduction in unfunded liabilities as the over-
funding approach, but at a smaller payroll contribution rate.
III. The Change in Unfunded Liabilities in DB to DC-MB Conversions
This section shows that conversion from an unfunded DB system with a fixed benefit to a
funded DC system with a minimum benefit guarantee (DC-MB) fails to significantly reduce
unfunded liabilities, thereby failing to achieve a major objective of pension reform.  This result holds
even at very high contribution rates in the DC-MB system, which are meant to over-fund the
expected benefit.  Remedies are considered later.
The generation-t agent lives for two periods and her expected lifetime utility equals,

















where cj,t is the consumption at age j in year t and 8 is the discount factor.
The generation-t agent earns wage income   revealed at the start of year t, consumes  at wt c t 1,
age 1 and saves the difference,  .  A share of savings,  , is invested into risk-free bonds that pay  st αt rt+1
in year t+1.  The other   share is invested into equities paying a risky return   in year t+1. ( ) 1−αt et+1
The individual faces a Social Security payroll tax equal to J
S, the proceeds of which are invested into









Before pension reform takes place, the individual’s budget constraints are:12 Arbitrage pricing will be used below to value marginal changes, allowing us to derive closed-form solutions.
This approach also allows market prices to speak for risk aversion instead of forcing us to defend particular forms of
preferences and technology. 
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(2) ( ) sw c t
S
tt =− − 1 1 τ ,
(3) ( ) ( )( ) [] ( ) csr e w g tt t t t t
S
tt 21 1 1 1 11 1 1 , ++ + + =⋅+ ++ − + + αα τ
The agent chooses the level of saving, s, and the portfolio share, ", to maximize equation (1)
subject to the constraints (2) and (3).  The first-order conditions are:
(4) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] Uc r EUc tt t t '' ,, 11 2 1 1 =+ ++ λ
(5) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] Uc E e Uc tt t t '' ,, 11 2 1 1 =⋅ + ⋅ ++ λ
The stock price process is described by an Itô-type stochastic differential equation and,
without loss in generality, has a stationary expected yield  .
12  While   for linear () eE e tt ≡ +1 r e =
utility, the inequality   holds with risk averse preferences (i.e., U ' > 0, U '' < 0). er t > +1
A Stylized Conversion Proposal
Conversion to private accounts begins with generation 1, the current workers.  Generation-0
agents, the current elderly, continue to receive benefits under the current pay-as-you-go (unfunded)
Social Security system.  These benefits are paid by generation 1 who receives nothing from Social
Security.  Hence, generation 1 bears the entire transition cost required of greater funding.
Generation-1 agent faces a new mandatory payroll tax,  , on top of their existing Social Security τ
M
payroll tax.  The mandatory contribution is invested into a private account to replace the lost Social
Security benefit.  Generation 2, and all subsequent generations, no longer face the Social Security
tax rate but instead contribute only   to their new mandatory private account.  Let   denote τ
M
t w ⋅ β t
the fraction of the new mandatory private account which is invest in the risk-less asset, and let
 represent the fraction invested in equities. 1− β t
The government guarantees that the new mandatory private account for each generation t (t- 14 -
$ 1) will replace at least some fraction, P, of the benefit that generation t would have received under
Social Security, i.e.,  .  A value of P = 1 means that the new account yields a ( ) χτ ⋅+ +
S
tt wg 1 1
benefit at least equal to the benefit that an agent would have receive under Social Security.  This
guarantee is paid using a state-contingent tax on the wage income of generation t+1:
(6) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] {}
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The new budget constraints for generation t $ 2, after pension reform, are now
(2') ( ) sw c t
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Now generation t chooses  ,  , and   to maximize equation (1) subject to constraints (2') and St α t β t
(3').  Denote the optimal values of these variables with asterisks (
*).
Proposition 1.  .  I.e., all assets in the new mandatory account are invested in equities. β t
* = 0
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side of equation (3') does not change, but the value of the contingent tax payment received from
generation t+1,  , increases.   So   could not have been optimal. Q.E.D. [] EM w tt t
c
t ⋅ ++ τ 11 β t
* > 0
In words, a rational agent would be throwing away some guarantee value by holding bonds
in their new mandatory portfolio; they should instead hold all their bonds in their non-mandatory
portfolio (assuming equal tax status).  The proof formally assumes that " is not bound between zero
and unity, i.e., there are no short-sale constraints in the non-mandatory private portfolio.  But that
assumption is innocuous.  If agents wanted to hold a negative amount of stocks in their non-13 For example, consider a person who must contribute $11 into his mandatory account and who saves an
additional $9, for a total of $20.  Suppose that with the guarantee over the mandatory account in place, this person would
like to save $10 in stocks and $10 in bonds.  This person could hold $11 in stocks in his mandatory account while holding
-$1 in stocks (a short position) and $10 in bonds in his non-mandatory account.
14 The financial market has demonstrated enormous creativity in writing contracts to game social insurance.
The Wall Street Journal (June 6, 2001) reports that insurance companies now offer annuities that convert assets into
income that allow even affluent people to qualify for Medicaid. (I am grateful to Mark Warshawsky for bringing this to
my attention.)  But, unlike the situation analyzed in the text, these securities exist even though they don’t provide a pure
arbitrage opportunity.  Moreover, a government crackdown on these annuities make sense on progressivity grounds.
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mandatory private portfolio, the capital market would allow them to do so since those short positions
could be fully collateralized by the long positions in the mandatory guaranteed portfolio.
13  The
market would not forego such an obvious no-risk (arbitrage) possibility.  Indeed, despite the private
market’s general unwillingness to write non-collateralized long-term contracts, this type of contract
is fully collateralized and, therefore, guaranteed to exist under no-arbitrage conditions.
14  To prevent
this type of market from occurring, the government would have to explicitly outlaw these types of
contracts.  However, that situation is unlikely to happen for two reasons.  First, it would be a
regressive policy that would allow wealthier individuals, who are unlikely to run up against short-
sale constraints, to exploit the guarantee more than the poor.  Second, it would be extremely costly
to enforce since it would be easily for financial institutions to verify portfolio holdings of agents.
With  , the new mandatory contribution rate,  , that is needed to produce an β t
* = 0 τ
M












where   is the stationary expected wage growth rate.  Moreover, the state-contingent tax equals, g




















01 115 My calculations are conservative.  As noted in Section I, the standard option pricing formula tends to
underestimate the value of a guarantee unless the shock is assumed to be shared across generations.
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Post-Conversion Change in Unfunded Liabilities with a Minimum Guarantee
The post-conversion percentage change in the unfunded liabilities in stochastic steady state

































































































































negates any attempt to arbitrage between risk-free bonds and equities.  The variable   is the price  Ω










next period.  This strike price is intuitive.  A larger expected benefit level (R) requires a higher
contribution rate J
M by equation (7) and lowers the strike price.  The reason is that more dollars are
being contributed to private accounts and so each dollar does not have to perform as well in order
to meet the minimum benefit.  Similarly, a higher guaranteed minimum benefit level (P) raises the
strike price since each dollar must perform better in order to satisfy the guarantee.
The parameters in equation (8) are directly observable, or can be computed using observable
prices.  The value of the put option can be priced exactly, without any additional assumptions about
the preferences beyond nonsatiation, using the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing theorem.
15  Price
moments are assumed to fully incorporate all relevant information about preferences.16 The choice of 30 years follows the two-period illustrative calculations presented in Feldstein and Samwick.
Since there have been only two unique 30-year periods since 1928, price moments for the option pricing formula were
calculated at an annual frequency and the time-to-maturity was taken as 30 years.  This approach does not incorporate
any slight mean reversion that might exist over a few years but it is still more conservative than using the standard
deviation for 30-year non-overlapping periods.  The use of 0.16 implicitly allows for some mean reversion.
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Computations
Table 2 reports values corresponding to equation (8) for various parameter choices shown
in Table 1. Following the 2000 Social Security Trustees Report, the annual average the risk-free rate,
r, is set equal to 3.0 percent and the economy's expected growth rate, g, is set at 1.0 percent per year.
Privatization is compared against a solvent Social Security system current-law benefits.  Solvency
requires eventually increasing the Social Security payroll tax rate to about 19.25 percent.  Following
Feldstein and Samwick, the average annual social return to equities (including corporate tax
payments),  , equals 9 percent.  The standard deviation of the first differences of logged real returns e
on the S&P500 since 1928 equals 0.20 and 0.164 since 1949.  I conservatively chose 0.16.  Each
period represents 30 years and all annual rates are converted to 30-year equivalents.
16
Whereas privatization with no guarantee (P = 0) would reduce unfunded liabilities by 100
percent, the presence of a realistic guarantee leads to much smaller reductions.  See Table 2.
Consider the case {R = 1.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.0}.  In words, R = 1.0 implies that the payroll tax
rate is chosen so that the expected retirement benefit provided by the DC-MB account exactly equals
the expected Social Security benefit.  The equality P = 1.0 implies that the government also
guarantees that the DC-MB retirement benefit at least equals the expected Social Security benefit.
The equality  $ = 0.0 reflects the fact that rational agents invest all of their DC-MB assets is stocks
(Proposition 1).  The variable exp shown in Table 2 equals $@r +  , the portfolio’s ( ) 1−βe
annualized expected net real rate of return, which equals 9 percent for these parameter choices.  This
particular case was considered by Feldstein and Samwick (1997) using a detailed simulation model
that did not include the market cost of risk.  As shown in Table 2, the model herein closely replicates17 These calculations are conservative, as they consider only marginal policy changes.  Risk aversion implies
that the marginal cost of the guarantee to taxpayers bearing the risk increases with the absolute size.
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their two percent contribution level that they showed could be used to fully replace Social Security
in the long run.  While unfunded liabilities are eliminated without a guarantee in place, unfunded
liabilities are reduced by only 18 percent with the guarantee.
17  Intuitively, a payroll tax of only two
percent places a large demand on the equity premium which is not exploitable herein. Guaranteeing
that this equity premium will, in fact, materialize constitutes a large unfunded liability.  Notice that
in the case {R = 2.0, P = 1.5, $ = 0.0}, unfunded liabilities actually increase by 15 percent.
The Ineffectiveness of Over-funding at Reducing Unfunded Liabilities
Now suppose the government increases the contribution rate in order to reduce guarantee
costs.  Consider doubling the contribution level: {R = 2.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.0}.  Table 2 shows that
privatization now reduces unfunded liabilities by 33 percent, up from 18 percent.  Tripling the
contribution level, {R = 3.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.0}, leads to a 46 percent reduction.  Increasing the
contribution level by five times, {R = 5.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.0}, leads to a 63 reduction, although
expected benefits are now five times larger than the Social Security benefit that is being guaranteed.
In fact, increasing the contribution level by ten times (not shown) leads to only a 83 percent
reduction in unfunded liabilities despite a payroll tax rate of 20 percent.  Two patterns, therefore,
emerge, confirming the intuition given in Section II: (i) over-funding is not very effective at
controlling guarantee costs in DC-MB plans and (ii) the marginal effectiveness of over-funding is
even lower at higher levels of funding.
Table 2 also gives more specific detailed information to further help explain the
ineffectiveness of over-funding.  Notice that the value of the put option,  ,  in the two-percent  Ω
accounts case, {R = 1.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.0}, equals $4.50.  The implicit strike price in this case equals









 e ( ) $11+ e ( ) $1 . $13. ⋅= 109 27
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a dollar invested today in stocks would be worth at least $13.27 in 30 years from now.  With a
contribution level five times larger, {R = 5.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.0}, the value of put option is $0.40 and





invested today in stocks would be worth at least $2.65 in 30 years.  Notice, therefore, that the
guarantee cost per dollar invested in stocks has decreased by ten times, from $4.50 to $0.40.
However, to get that reduction, five times more dollars must be invested and guaranteed.  The net
impact, therefore, is not large.  The value of the guarantee per dollar invested would have to decrease
by considerably more than ten times in order to significantly reduce net costs.  The reason it does not,
however, reflects the market value of insurance against very low equity returns, even if they are
uncommon.  Sections IV and V below examine two techniques that increase returns in the bad states
of the world by reducing returns in the good states.
Sensitivity Analysis
Tables 3A and 3B provide some sensitivity analysis to the results provided for the benchmark
case.  Table 3A decreases   from 9 percent per year to 6 percent per year; a recent study e
commissioned by the Social Security Advisory Board (2001) motivates this assumed lower rate of
return.  Table 3B maintains the value of   at 6 percent and increases F to 0.20.   e
Table 3A shows that the effect of assuming a lower value   is to reduce the unfunded e
liabilities associated with a parameter combination {R, P, $} whenever $ < 1.  The reason for the
reduction is that a lower   requires a higher mandatory contribution rate J
M and so less emphasis e
is being placed on the equity premium.  Notice, for example, that J
M increases from 2.0 percent of
payroll in the case {R = 1.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.0;   = 0.09} to 4.5 percent of payroll when in the case e
{R = 1.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.0;   = 0.06}.  Whereas unfunded liabilities where reduced by 18 percent e
in the former case they are now reduced by 38 percent.  At higher initial contribution levels, the- 20 -
impact is even small.  Whereas unfunded liabilities decreased by 63 percent in the case {R = 5.0,
P = 1.0, $ = 0.0;   = 0.09}, they decrease by 86 percent in the case {R = 5.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.0;  e e
= 0.06}, despite the payroll tax increasing from 10 percent to 23 percent.
Table 3B shows that the effect of assuming a larger value of F is to increase the value of the
minimum benefit guarantee.  The value of F has no impact on the mandatory tax rate J
M since the
tax rate is based on expected returns, not risk.  For {R = 1.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.0;   = 0.06; F = 0.20} e
shown in Table 3B, unfunded liabilities are reduced by 34 percent, compared with 38 percent shown
in Table 3A when F = 0.16.  For  {R = 5.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.0;   = 0.06; F = 0.20}, unfunded e
liabilities are reduced by 78 percent instead of 86 percent when F = 0.16.  The value of F is slightly
more important (in terms of percentage change in unfunded liabilities) at higher values of R because
a shift in the risk distribution becomes slightly more important at lower strike prices.  However,
since most of the value of the guarantee stems from protecting very low returns, the importance of
F (in terms of percentage change in unfunded liabilities) is fairly uniform in R.
IV. Minimum Benefit Guarantee with a Standardized Portfolio 
Now suppose the government only insurers a “standardized” portfolio consisting of some
bonds ($ > 0).  (Taxing benefits in good states of the world is added later.)  Investors bear any “basis
risk” if they choose a portfolio different from the standardized portfolio.  With $ > 0, the new
mandatory contribution rate,  , needed to produce an expected benefit R times the expected τ
M
Social Security benefit in the standardized portfolio is













The state-contingent tax is still given by equation (6).  The change in unfunded liabilities for the


























































































































where   is the price of a one-period put option on a dollars worth of investment with a strike price   Ω
 (9)  = 
()() ( ) [] ()
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Notice that, when $ = 0, the reduction in liability, (8'), and strike price, (9), are the same as before.
Interior Case: 0 < $ < 1 
It is easy to see that the value of the guarantee is reduced as the share of bonds, $, in the
standardized portfolio is increased.  A larger $ generates a larger mandatory contribution level, with
all of the extra contribution invested into the risk-free asset.  In fact, it is possible that the strike
price, equation (9), could go negative, if enough bonds are held ($ o 0) and if the expected benefit
is set much larger than the guaranteed benefit (R o P).  In this case, the portion of payroll
contributions making its way into bonds is large enough that even a zero gross return to stocks, (1+e)
= 0, satisfies the guarantee.  Hence, the guarantee would have no value.
Limit Case: $ 6 1
The guarantee has no value in the boundary case, $ = 1, with R = P.  The standardized
portfolio holds only risk-free bonds ($ = 1) and the (deterministic) retirement benefit exactly equals
the minimum benefit (R = P).  The strike price shown in equation (9) approaches zero, and so the- 22 -
option has no value.
When  , things get more complicated.  The strike price diverges to positive [negative] χψ ≠
infinity when P > R [P < R] as $ 6 1.  Intuitively, the option for sure will pay off [not pay off] when
P > R [P < R].  When P > R, the minimum benefit exceeds the final retirement benefit which is also
deterministic since $ = 1; so the option must pay off.  When P < R, the minimum benefit is less than
the final retirement benefit which again is deterministic ($ = 1); the option never pays off.
Hence, the option, as configured above, obviously has infinite value (P > R) or no value (P
< R).  But the infinite value case need not worry us.  Notice from equation (8') that the value of the
guarantee itself is composed of the put option pre-multiplied by an expression that converges to zero
as $ 6 1.  Hence, we have the “0A4” indeterminate form when P > R.  We can algebraically
manipulate out of the predicament (i.e., bifurcation is unnecessary).  When $ = 1, the state-
contingent tax rate becomes,




t g ++ =⋅ + ⋅ − 11 10
and the change in unfunded liabilities becomes,





































In words, unfunded liabilities are reduced by less than 100 percent if the minimum benefit guarantee
exceeds deterministic retirement assets (P > R).  But unfunded liabilities are fully eliminated if the
minimum benefit guarantee is less than deterministic retirement assets (P < R).
Calculations
Table 2 shows that insuring only a standardized portfolio mixed with bonds is fairly effective
at reducing unfunded liabilities.  Consider, for example, the case {R = 3.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.50} in- 23 -
which half of the assets in the standardized portfolio are held in bonds.  These parameter choices
result in a 10 percent mandatory contribution rate.  That tax rate is roughly same value as in the case
considered in the last section, {R = 5.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.0}, that used the over-saving strategy with
no standardization of the guaranteed portfolio (and so agents rationally only held stocks in their MB-
DC accounts).  Unfunded liabilities are reduced by 79 percent with the standardized portfolio, {R
= 3.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.50}, but by only 63  percent, using the over-funding strategy, {R = 5.0, P = 1.0,
$ = 0.0}.  In other words, the moral hazard cost associated with failing to insure only a standardized
portfolio is equal to 15 percent of the current unfunded liability.  In dollar terms, for a unfunded
liability of about $10 trillion as in the US, the cost of moral hazard alone would be $1.5 trillion.
As motivated in Section II, the greater effectiveness of the standardized portfolio approach
in reducing unfunded liabilities stems from the fact that standardization shifts a portion of the payoff
in the good states of the world to the bad states.  In contrast, the over-funding approach
proportionally increases the payoffs in each non-absorbing state of the world.  So the over-funding
approach does not subsidize returns in bad states with returns from the good states.  The
standardization approach, therefore, can produce a relatively larger payoff in bad states of the world
at the same contribution rate.
Table 2 shows several cases in which standardization can be used to fully eliminate the ex-
ante value of unfunded liabilities in the DC-MB system.  For example, in the case {R = 1.0, P = 1.0,
$ = 1.0}, the contribution rate is a little below 11 percent and the standardized portfolio consists of
only bonds.  Unfunded liabilities are reduced by 100 percent.  The same is true in the case, {R = 5.0,
P = 0.75, $ = 0.50}, where the standardized portfolio consists of a 50-50 split between stocks and
bonds, but only three-quarters of the existing Social Security benefit level is guaranteed.  The
corresponding payroll tax rate equals 16½ percent, which is below the 19¼ percent payroll tax rate
eventually required under Social Security.  The expected benefit in the new DC-MB plan with this18 The standardized portfolio approach also rules out the limiting absorbing state; the over-saving approach does.
19 Equivalently, assets could be held by the government in a trust fund so that the government can strip off any
excess returns, and subsidized low returns, in order to produce a fixed benefit.  Indeed, with a confiscatory tax, investors
realize that their portfolio decisions are irrelevant.  So the government could save on transaction costs by keeping all the
money held in a central fund.  But, of course, there are several political-economy risks associated with holding assets
in a central trust fund within a cash-flow budgetary framework.  These include using the assets for other purposes.
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configuration, however, is five times larger than the Social Security benefit.  Unfunded liabilities are
eliminated under these parameter settings.  In contrast, unfunded liabilities can never be fully
eliminated using the over-funding approach.
18  Sensitivity analysis provided in Tables 3A and 3B
show that unfunded liabilities continue to be eliminated in the cases considered above under the two
alternative sets of assumptions but at a cost of higher tax rates.  
V. Taxing Returns in Good States to Pay For Subsidizing Returns in Bad States
The government could also shift some of the asset returns in the good states of the world to
the bad states using explicit state-contingent taxation.  For comparability, this section considers the
extreme case in which the government uses a confiscatory tax to take away all assets in excess of
the guaranteed benefit level.  The government still guarantees a minimum benefit equal to P times
the current Social Security benefit level.  Hence, the combination of the minimum benefit guarantee,
along with the confiscatory tax on all returns above that same benefit level, implies that the
government is promising a fixed benefit equal to P times the current Social Security benefit.  So, for
example, the case P = 1 corresponds to pre-funding the current Social Security system.  Hence, the
analysis incorporates pre-funding the current defined-benefit system – i.e., without conversion to
private accounts – as a special case.
19
The conversion from pay-as-you-go financing to more funding is the same as before.  In
particular, the mandatory contribution rate is given by equation (7') and $ fraction of these
contributions are deposited in bonds and the other (1-$) fraction goes into equities.  Only a tax on- 25 -
returns in the good states is new.
A confiscatory tax on benefits above the guaranteed level can be absorbed into the state-
contingent tax shown in equation (6).  Recall, that the tax shown in equation (6) was previously used
to subsidize shortfalls in retirement assets.  Since, in the current section, the government now
collects revenue from taxes on benefits in the good states of the world, the new state-contingent tax
is similar to equation (6) except without the max operator that was previously used to separate high
and low returns:
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Proposition 2.  , holding with equality ] $ = 1 and  .  I.e., for identical %% ∆∆ FM ≥ ψ χ <
parameters, prefunding a fixed benefit weakly reduces ex-ante liabilities more than privatization,
with equal reduction if and only if the final retirement benefit is less than guaranteed benefit level
with measure one.
Proof.  For any x,   Y    Y   xxx =+ max[ , ] min[ , ] 00 [] max , 0 xx ≥ [ ] () EM x tt ⋅max , 0
$  , holding with equality only if  = 0.  Now compare the second lines in () EMx tt ⋅ ( ) Pr x > 0
equations (8') and (9) and substitute the expression in the max operator in (8') for x. Q.E.D.- 26 -
The state-contingent tax approach, equation (6'''), like the earlier standardization approach,
shifts returns from the good states of the world to the bad states.  Proposition 2 says that when used
with or without the standardization approach, the state-contingent tax (6''') reduces unfunded
liabilities even more.  The reason is that, in any state where the retirement benefit exceeds the
minimum, the difference is taxed away, reducing the ex-ante cost of the entire guarantee.  The state-
contingent tax (6''') fails to reduce ex-ante liabilities if and only if the retirement benefit does not
exceed the guaranteed benefit level in every possible state of the world.  That last outcome, in turn,
requires that all investments are made in bonds ($ = 1) and that the contribution rate is low enough
to produce a small enough benefit ( ). ψ χ <
The intuition for Proposition 2 can also be expressed in the language of financial engineering.
The fixed benefit guarantee can be decomposed into a long position in a put stock option (the max
operator in the above proof) and a short position in a call option (the min operator in the proof) with
the same strike price, shown in equation (9).  The confiscatory tax on large returns gives the
government a call option, which partially compensates it for the put option that it gives pensioners
in the form of a minimum benefit guarantee.  That call option is valuable, unless there is no chance
for it to be “in the money,” which occurs if and only if the retirement benefit is less than the
guaranteed benefit level with certainty (requiring only bond investments and a low contribution rate).
It is easy to see from equation (10) that there are parameter combinations such than unfunded
liabilities are reduced by more than 100 percent in the fixed benefit case (e.g., $ = 1 and R > P).
A reduction this large might be desirable on a purely normative basis if future generations face other
large liabilities stemming from other government programs (e.g., Medicare).
A reduction this large is not possible with standardization alone.  The best that
standardization can do is to reduce liabilities by 100 percent by guaranteeing a portfolio with enough
bonds.  But with an additional tax on returns in good states, as now considered, the government- 27 -
would actually collect revenue in good states.  Liabilities can be reduced by more than 100 percent.
Even if $ < 1, liabilities are reduced by more than 100 percent if the ex-ante value of the tax revenue
collected in the good states exceeds the value of subsidies owed in the bad states.
These results can again be interpreted using the language of financial engineering.  The first-
order conditions (5) and (6) can be combined to generate the classic put-call parity relationship.  If
the strike (9) equals $1(1+r) then the put and call options have equal worth by put-call parity.  So
unfunded liabilities are reduced by exactly 100 percent, i.e., the call option exactly pays for the put
option.  If, however, equation (9) is less than $1(1+r), then the call option becomes more valuable
than the put option, and so unfunded liabilities are reduced by more than 100 percent.  We can now
turn to the calculations.
Calculations
Table 2 presents calculations of the reduction in unfunded liabilities,  , with a tax on %∆ F
benefits in the good states.  First, consider cases in which the expected benefit level is set equal to
the guaranteed benefit level (R = P).  Notice that, in this case, the reduction in unfunded liabilities
is well below 100 percent, unless the bond share of assets equals one ($ = 1).
For example, in the case {R=1, P =1, $ = 0}, where all investments are in equities, liabilities
are reduced by only 18.3 percent.  Notice that this reduction is only slightly larger than the 17.9
percent reduction stated earlier where the government guaranteed a minimum benefit but did not tax
the upside.  The reason that the reduction is not much larger when the government actually does tax
the upside is that the strike price (9) equals   at these parameters.  So equities must perform ( ) $11+ e
at least as expected in order to satisfy the minimum benefit level.  The ex-ante cost of guaranteeing
that equities will perform as expected (including the equity premium) is quite large in the presence
of risk aversion, relative to the ex-ante value of the tax revenue collected in the good states.  In the
language of financial engineering,   is much larger than $1(1+r) and so the put option is ( ) $11+ e20 See, for example, the CBO (1999) and OMB (1999).
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much more valuable than the call option.
This result should give policymakers – and budget authorities – some pause.  Traditional
budgetary cost rules used by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the US Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) focus only on expected returns.
20  Under those rules, it would
appear that all of Social Security’s unfunded liabilities could eventually be eliminated with a two-
percent contribution invested in equities.  But the actual risk-adjusted reduction in liabilities would
be much smaller, less than one-fifth.
Now consider the effect of over-funding the retirement benefit, by setting the contribution
rate high enough to produce an expected benefit much larger than the minimum benefit.  Recall that,
without a tax on returns in good states, over-funding was not very effective at reducing the value of
unfunded liabilities.  However, with a benefit’s tax in good states, over-funding becomes much more
effective because the ex-ante value of tax receipts collected in good states grows in proportion to the
contribution rate.  For example, in the case {R = 5.0, P = 1.0, $ = 0.0}, unfunded liabilities are
reduced by 91½ percent with a benefit’s tax in good states, but by only 63 percent without that tax,
as considered earlier.  As shown analytically above, the ex-ante value of that state-contingent tax
revenue can even be larger than the ex-ante value of the subsidy paid in the bad states.  In this case,
unfunded liabilities are reduced by more than 100 percent, as shown in several cases in Table 2.
H Sensitivity analysis shown in Tables 3A and 3B continues to confirm the ability of a state-
contingent tax to reduce unfunded liabilities.  But notice that the change in unfunded liabilities for
the fixed benefit is the same in Tables 3A and 3B.  The reason is that the standard deviation of stock
returns does not directly impact the reduction in unfunded liabilities, as shown in equation (10).
Intuitively, the government now participates in the upside potential of stock returns while continuing
to insure the downside.  Hence, the importance of the standard deviation term itself washes out; all- 29 -
risk is captured directly by the equity premium itself.
VI. Conclusion
Many countries have converted their unfunded defined-benefit (DB) public pension plans to
funded defined-contribution (DC) plans.  Most public DC plans contain minimum benefit guarantees
(DC-MB) but assets are not set aside as a reserve; the guarantees are pay-as-you-go, or unfunded.
Risk management techniques must be used to contain the cost of these guarantees, especially since
the guarantee itself encourages people to invest their DC-MB accounts in risky assets (Proposition
1) in order to maximize the value of the guarantee.
This paper shows that the conventional method of controlling guarantee costs in DC-MB
plans – over-funding – is not terribly effective.  Over-funding involves setting the contribution rate
high enough so that the expected retirement benefit is much larger than the minimum benefit.  This
paper shows that even a very large contribution rate barely changes the value of unfunded liabilities,
because it simply increases retirement benefits proportionally in all non-absorbing states of the world
(with no change in absorbing states).  A new risk management strategy, therefore, is needed in the
new era of DC-MB plans.  
This paper considers two new approaches to controlling guarantee costs.  The first approach
borrows an idea from the recent catastrophic insurance literature.  The guarantee is placed over a
“standardized” portfolio, requiring agents to accept any “basis risk” if they chose a non-standard
portfolio.  This approach is especially useful for smaller conversions in which at least of modest DB
benefit remains.  However, for large conversions from DB to DC-MB plans, in which there is little
or no DB benefit remaining, the government must still worry about any “implicit guarantee” that
might extend beyond the standardized portfolio (the so-called “Samaritan’s Dilemma”) which might
entice agents to accept a lot of basis risk.  The second method, therefore, uses a more brute-force
approach involving state-contingent taxes: positive taxes are levied on excessive returns in the good- 30 -
states of the world and negative taxes (subsidies) are levied on returns in the bad states.  Both options
are very effective at controlling guarantee costs, and they can be used separately or together.
Calculations demonstrate that all of the unfunded liabilities associated with modern pay-as-you-go
public pension programs can be eliminated under both approaches, even at a modest contribution
rate.  The state-contingent tax policy can, in addition, even reduce unfunded liabilities by more than
100 percent.  Reducing Social Security’s liabilities by more than 100 percent might be desirable to
the extent that future generations face other large liabilities (e.g., Medicare).
These two alternative methods are effective in reducing unfunded liabilities because they shift
resources from the good states of the world to the bad states (and, in the process, also eliminate
absorbing states). In effect, the payoff in each bad state is partly financed by reducing the payoffs in
the good states.  As a result, for the same contribution rate, unfunded liabilities are lower under these
two remedies relative to the traditional over-funding approach which does not perform this shift.
Equivalently, state-contingent taxation and standardization can achieve the same reduction in
unfunded liabilities as the over-funding approach, but at a smaller payroll contribution rate.- 31 -
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Variable Definitions     
Variable Definition
R Expected retirement benefit in private account = R × Social Security benefit
P Guaranteed benefit in private account = P × Social Security benefit
$ Share of assets in private account invested in bonds
exp   =   , i.e., the expected net annual real return to private account () ββ re +− 1
J
M Mandatory contribution (tax) rate for the new private account
%)M Percent change in unfunded liabilities with the minimum benefit guarantee
%)F Percent change in unfunded liabilities with the fixed benefit guarantee
Value of implicit put option for the minimum benefit guarantee
e Expected annual real rate of return to equities
r Real annual risk-free return
g Average annual real rate of wage growth















M %)M %)F  Ω
1.0 0.75 0.0 0.090 0.020 42.6 43.3 3.1
1.0 0.75 0.5 0.060 0.033 55.2 55.9 2.9
1.0 0.75 1.0 0.030 0.107 100.0 125.0 0.0
1.0 1.00 0.0 0.090 0.020 17.9 18.3 4.5
1.0 1.00 0.5 0.060 0.033 30.6 30.9 4.5
1.0 1.00 1.0 0.030 0.107 100.0 100.0 4.5
2.0 0.75 0.0 0.090 0.039 56.4 61.6 1.2
2.0 0.75 0.5 0.060 0.066 79.7 86.9 0.7
2.0 0.75 1.0 0.030 0.214 100.0 225.0 0.0
2.0 1.00 0.0 0.090 0.039 33.4 36.6 1.8
2.0 1.00 0.5 0.060 0.066 58.1 61.9 1.4
2.0 1.00 1.0 0.030 0.214 100.0 200.0 0.0
2.0 1.25 0.0 0.090 0.039 9.5 11.6 2.5
2.0 1.25 0.5 0.060 0.066 34.7 36.9 2.1
2.0 1.25 1.0 0.030 0.214 100.0 175.0 0.0
2.0 1.50 0.0 0.090 0.039 -14.8 -13.4 3.1
2.0 1.50 0.5 0.060 0.066 10.5 11.9 2.9
2.0 1.50 1.0 0.030 0.214 100.0 150.0 0.0
3.0 0.75 0.0 0.090 0.059 66.4 79.9 0.6
3.0 0.75 0.5 0.060 0.099 94.3 117.8 0.1
3.0 0.75 1.0 0.030 0.321 100.0 325.0 0.0
3.0 1.00 0.0 0.090 0.059 45.7 54.9 1.0
3.0 1.00 0.5 0.060 0.099 79.0 92.8 0.5
3.0 1.00 1.0 0.030 0.321 100.0 300.0 0.0
3.0 1.50 0.0 0.090 0.059 0.1 4.9 1.8
3.0 1.50 0.5 0.060 0.099 37.1 42.8 1.4
3.0 1.50 1.0 0.030 0.321 100.0 250.0 0.0
5.0 0.75 0.0 0.090 0.098 79.0 116.5 0.2
5.0 0.75 0.5 0.060 0.165 100.0 179.7 0.0
5.0 0.75 1.0 0.030 0.534 100.0 525.0 0.0
5.0 1.00 0.0 0.090 0.098 62.8 91.5 0.4
5.0 1.00 0.5 0.060 0.165 98.5 154.7 0.0
5.0 1.00 1.0 0.030 0.534 100.0 500.0 0.0
5.0 1.50 0.0 0.090 0.098 23.7 41.5 0.8
5.0 1.50 0.5 0.060 0.165 76.5 104.7 0.3
5.0 1.50 1.0 0.030 0.534 100.0 450.0 0.0Table 3A
Change in Unfunded Liabilities – 
Sensitivity Analysis ( = 0.06) e
Exogenous Parameters
RP$ exp J
M %)M %)F  Ω
1.0 0.75 0.0 0.060 0.045 59.9 67.3 0.9
1.0 0.75 0.5 0.045 0.064 78.1 84.4 0.7
1.0 0.75 1.0 0.030 0.107 100.0 125.0 0.0
1.0 1.00 0.0 0.060 0.045 37.5 42.3 1.5
1.0 1.00 0.5 0.045 0.064 56.1 59.4 1.5
1.0 1.00 1.0 0.030 0.107 100.0 100.0 1.5
2.0 0.75 0.0 0.060 0.090 77.1 109.5 0.3
2.0 0.75 0.5 0.045 0.127 99.1 143.8 0.0
2.0 0.75 1.0 0.030 0.214 100.0 225.0 0.0
2.0 1.00 0.0 0.060 0.090 60.1 84.5 0.5
2.0 1.00 0.5 0.045 0.127 90.8 118.8 0.2
2.0 1.00 1.0 0.030 0.214 100.0 200.0 0.0
2.0 1.25 0.0 0.060 0.090 40.7 59.5 0.7
2.0 1.25 0.5 0.045 0.127 75.4 93.8 0.4
2.0 1.25 1.0 0.030 0.214 100.0 175.0 0.0
2.0 1.50 0.0 0.060 0.090 19.8 34.5 0.9
2.0 1.50 0.5 0.045 0.127 56.1 68.8 0.7
2.0 1.50 1.0 0.030 0.214 100.0 150.0 0.0
3.0 0.75 0.0 0.060 0.136 85.7 151.8 0.1
3.0 0.75 0.5 0.045 0.190 100.0 203.2 0.0
3.0 0.75 1.0 0.030 0.321 100.0 325.0 0.0
3.0 1.00 0.0 0.060 0.136 73.1 126.8 0.2
3.0 1.00 0.5 0.045 0.190 99.8 178.2 0.0
3.0 1.00 1.0 0.030 0.321 100.0 300.0 0.0
3.0 1.50 0.0 0.060 0.136 40.2 76.8 0.5
3.0 1.50 0.5 0.045 0.190 86.1 128.2 0.2
3.0 1.50 1.0 0.030 0.321 100.0 250.0 0.0
5.0 0.75 0.0 0.060 0.226 93.2 236.3 0.0
5.0 0.75 0.5 0.045 0.318 100.0 322.1 0.0
5.0 0.75 1.0 0.030 0.534 100.0 525.0 0.0
5.0 1.00 0.0 0.060 0.226 86.0 211.3 0.1
5.0 1.00 0.5 0.045 0.318 100.0 297.1 0.0
5.0 1.00 1.0 0.030 0.534 100.0 500.0 0.0
5.0 1.50 0.0 0.060 0.226 64.2 161.3 0.2
5.0 1.50 0.5 0.045 0.318 100.0 247.1 0.0
5.0 1.50 1.0 0.030 0.534 100.0 450.0 0.0Table 3B
Change in Unfunded Liabilities
Sensitivity Analysis ( = 0.06; F = 0.20) e
Exogenous Parameters
RP$ exp J
M %)M %)F  Ω
1.0 0.75 0.0 0.060 0.045 56.2 67.3 1.0
1.0 0.75 0.5 0.045 0.064 75.5 84.4 0.8
1.0 0.75 1.0 0.030 0.107 100.0 125.0 0.0
1.0 1.00 0.0 0.060 0.045 34.1 42.3 1.6
1.0 1.00 0.5 0.045 0.064 53.7 59.4 1.6
1.0 1.00 1.0 0.030 0.107 100.0 100.0 1.6
2.0 0.75 0.0 0.060 0.090 71.1 109.5 0.3
2.0 0.75 0.5 0.045 0.127 98.2 143.8 0.0
2.0 0.75 1.0 0.030 0.214 100.0 225.0 0.0
2.0 1.00 0.0 0.060 0.090 53.1 84.5 0.6
2.0 1.00 0.5 0.045 0.127 87.3 118.8 0.2
2.0 1.00 1.0 0.030 0.214 100.0 200.0 0.0
2.0 1.25 0.0 0.060 0.090 33.4 59.5 0.8
2.0 1.25 0.5 0.045 0.127 70.6 93.8 0.5
2.0 1.25 1.0 0.030 0.214 100.0 175.0 0.0
2.0 1.50 0.0 0.060 0.090 12.5 34.5 1.0
2.0 1.50 0.5 0.045 0.127 51.0 68.8 0.8
2.0 1.50 1.0 0.030 0.214 100.0 150.0 0.0
3.0 0.75 0.0 0.060 0.136 79.3 151.8 0.2
3.0 0.75 0.5 0.045 0.190 100.0 203.2 0.0
3.0 0.75 1.0 0.030 0.321 100.0 325.0 0.0
3.0 1.00 0.0 0.060 0.136 64.7 126.8 0.3
3.0 1.00 0.5 0.045 0.190 99.6 178.2 0.0
3.0 1.00 1.0 0.030 0.321 100.0 300.0 0.0
3.0 1.50 0.0 0.060 0.136 29.7 76.8 0.6
3.0 1.50 0.5 0.045 0.190 80.9 128.2 0.2
3.0 1.50 1.0 0.030 0.321 100.0 250.0 0.0
5.0 0.75 0.0 0.060 0.226 87.8 236.3 0.1
5.0 0.75 0.5 0.045 0.318 100.0 322.1 0.0
5.0 0.75 1.0 0.030 0.534 100.0 525.0 0.0
5.0 1.00 0.0 0.060 0.226 77.7 211.3 0.1
5.0 1.00 0.5 0.045 0.318 100.0 297.1 0.0
5.0 1.00 1.0 0.030 0.534 100.0 500.0 0.0
5.0 1.50 0.0 0.060 0.226 51.4 161.3 0.2
5.0 1.50 0.5 0.045 0.318 100.0 247.1 0.0
5.0 1.50 1.0 0.030 0.534 100.0 450.0 0.0